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RECENT DECISIONS
New York has also adopted PENAL LAw §§ 43, 720, 722, which in
application cover the same ground as Pennsylvania's recognition
of common law crimes.
Under Section 43 a defendant was convicted of openly out-
raging public decency in asking two little girls to commit sodomy
with him. People v. Casey, 188 Misc. 352, 67 N. Y. S. 2d 9 (City
Ct. Utica 1946).
Under Section 720, the shouting of obscenities in defendant's
own backyard, but loud enough to be heard in the street, was held
to be disorderly conduct. People v. Whitman, 157 N. Y. Supp.
1107 (County Ct. 1916).
A case that clearly points up the propinquity of New York's
statutory provisions to Pennsylvania common law is People v.
Daly, 154 Misc. 149, 276 N. Y. Supp. 583 (Sp. Sess. 1935), where
defendant was convicted of disorderly conduct for threatening
bodily harm and using abusive language over the telephone.
An appraisal of the decisions under Pennsylvania common
law auspices and those dealing with the purview of the New York
"dragnet" provisions indicates that these states,, among others,
although they endorse the principle of legality and the doctrine
of nulle poena sine lege, do not wish to be precluded from deal-
ing with grossly anti-social behavior that cannot be subsumed
under any specific positive sanction.
Howard L. Meyer, II
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-- RIGHT OF STRANGERS TO
ATI'ACK FOREIGN DIVORCE DECREE
Petition by collateral heirs to remove decedent's purported
wife as administratrix of his estate on the ground that their mar-
riage was void, because the divorce decree obtained in Idaho by
the purported wife from her former husband was invalid for lack
of jurisdiction. Held (5-4): Collateral heirs have no standing to
attack the decree in this instance. Estate of Englund, - Wash.
-, 277 P. 2d 717 (1954).
A decree of divorce in one state is subject to collateral im-
peachment in another by proof of lack of jurisdiction. Williams
v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 226 (1944). No case has been found
that precludes a stranger, as such, from maintaining a collateral
attack on a divorce decree on grounds, which if proven, would
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render the decree void for lack of jurisdiction. See note, 12 A. L.
R. 2d 729.
The instant case is one of first impression for the Washington
courts, although litigated extensively in other jurisdictions. The
controlling statute is Section 20, Chapter 215, Laws of 1949, ROW
26.08.200, adopted from the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act,
Section 1, 9 U. L. A., which provides that a foreign divorce is void
if both parties were domiciled in Washington at the time of the
commencement of the divorce proceedings. Both opinions admit
that under this statute, the subsequent marriage of the adminis-
tratrix was void ab initio, but the majority contends that since the
collateral heirs were strangers to the divorce proceedings, and
since the decree did not affect any rights or interests acquired by
them prior to its rendition, they have no right to attack it. (277
P. 2d at 721.)
Analysis discloses that cases relied upon to preclude collateral
attack by strangers are either cases deciding the attack on the
merits and concluding a stranger under these circumstances cannot
attack; Sorensen v. Sorensen, 219 App. Div. 344, 220 N. Y. Supp.
242 (2d Dep't 1927) ; or holding a stranger may not attack a decree
which is only voidable at the instance of the parties; Crockett v.
Crockett, 27 Wash. 2d 877, 187 P. 2d 180 (1947) ; or denying attack
because the stranger had no right or interest affected adversely
by the decree; Farah v. Farah, 196 Misc. 460, 92 N. Y. S. 2d 187
(Sup. Ct. 1949).
The dissenting opinion relies on the plain meaning of the
statute to argue that since the marriage was void ab initio, the
collateral heirs have such an interest in the estate of the deceased
as to maintain a collateral attack on the foreign divorce decree.
277 P. 2d at 723. The commissioners' notes with reference to this
particular section of the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act state
that the purpose of the act is to refuse recognition of extra-state
divorces obtained by domiciliaries except as specifically required
by the Constitution of the United States, in order to discourage
migration in pursuit of a divorce. See 9 U. L. A. 364.
There are numerous decisions holding that a child has such an
interest in the estate of a parent that he may collaterally attack
a prior divorce of a purported surviving spouse. In re Petersen's
Estate, 192 Misc. 243, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 572 (Surr. Ct. 1948). Even
though on the merits the divorce was found valid, standing to col-
laterally attack was allowed. In re Torkkila's Estate, 198 Misc.
265, 98 N. Y. S. 2d 460 (Surr. Ct. 1950); In re Paul's Estate, 77
Cal. App. 2d 403, 175 P. 2d 284 (1946). This interest in the estate
of a deceased person has been extended to other collateral heirs
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to allow them to challenge a prior divorce of a surviving spouse.
In re Pusey's Estate, 180 Cal. 368, 181 P. 648 (1919). See Nim-
mer's Estate v. Nimmer, 212 S. C. 311, 47 S. E. 2d 716 (1948),
where on similar facts collateral attack by heirs was allowed.
Decisions which seem to deny this interest in heirs are dis-
tinguishable because of the appearance of the other party in the
divorce proceedings, thereby estopping any collateral denial of
jurisdiction. Johnson v. Muelberge.r, 340 U. S. 581 (1951); Shea
v. Shea, 270 App. Div. 527, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 823 (2d Dep't 1946).
The instant case represents the great reluctance by courts to
allow collateral attack on seemingly valid marriages, but this
writer suggests the majority reasoning here is too restrained, espe-
cially in view of decisions in other jurisdictions and the policy
underlying the Uniform Divorce Recognition Act. This policy is
to refuse recognition of foreign divorce decrees acquired by domi-
cilaries, subject only to constitutional limitations. The Williams
case suggests that there would be no constitutional obstacle to
declaration of the invalidity of the instant divorce decree.
Paul A. Foley
EVIDENCE - CROSS-EXAMINATION TO EIPEACH
CREDIBILITY HELD PREJUDICIAL
In an action to recover for personal injuries received while
boarding a bus, plaintiff was cross-examined as to prior convic-
tions for intoxication. Held (4-1): Since intoxication is not a
crime, such questioning was not competent to impeach credibility
and should have been excluded. McQuage v. City of New York,
285 App. Div. 249, 136 N. Y. S. 2d 111 (1st Dep't 1954).
For purposes of attacking credibility, a witness may be cross-
examined concerning any immoral, vicious, or criminal act of his
life which may affect his character and tend to show him to be
unworthy of belief. RIcHARDso, EvIDENCE (7th ed. 1948) § 576;
People v. Sorge, 301 N. Y. 198, 93 N. E. 2d 637 (1950). Jurisdic-
tions differ as to what types of moral misconduct are relevant to
veracity and thus a proper subject of cross-examination. The
English rule has been to allow anything to be asked. Diametrical-
ly opposed are two or three states which forbit any inquiries into
the moral past of the witness. However, most states, including
New York, follow a middle course. According to this theory, the
range of the questioning is left to the control of the trial judge.
WIGMORE, EvnDENcE § 146 (Students' Ed. 1935). In Freidel v. Board
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